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Abstract
The e⁄ects of four environmental policy options for the reduction of
pollution emissions, i.e. taxes, emission standards, auctioned permits and
freely allocated permits, are analyzed. The setup is a real option model
where the amount of emissions is determined by solving the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t
maximization problem under each policy instrument. The regulator solves
an optimal stopping problem in order to ￿nd the critical threshold for
policy adoptions taking into account revenues from taxes and auctioned
permits and government spending. In this framework, we ￿nd the rank-
ing of the alternative policy options in terms of their adoption lag and
social welfare. We show that when the output demand is elastic emission
standards are preferred to freely allocated permits. Taxes and auctioned
permits are always equivalent in terms of their adoption lag and social
welfare and also equivalent to emission standards when the regulator re-
distributes revenues.
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11 Introduction
Policy instruments to promote environmental protection can take various forms
and include o¢ cial restrictions and positive incentives designed to control ac-
tivities that may be harmful to the quality of environment. Taxes and subsidies
can be e⁄ective to encourage compliance with environmental policy. Tradable
emission permits allow the government to give companies licenses to pollute as
much as they wish to the extent that they pay the price. Thus, companies can
buy, sell and exchange these permits in a market. Other environmental policy
instruments include legislations enacted to prohibit the use of certain harmful
substances, set limits on emissions, enforce certain technical standards, limit
some activities in special areas such as nature reserves or car-free areas in cities
and control land use planning. All the listed environmental policies are usually
welfare distorting and thus it becomes relevant to rank alternative policy op-
tions and assess their relative desirability in terms of environmental quality and
social welfare.
In this paper the e⁄ects of four environmental policy options for the reduc-
tion of pollution emissions, i.e. taxes, emission standards, auctioned permits and
freely allocated permits, are analyzed. The setup is a real option model where
the adoption timing of each policy instrument is analyzed. Our work endoge-
nously takes into account the level of emissions before and after the adoption
of the new environmental policy. The level of emissions is determined for each
policy instrument by solving the pro￿t maximization problem of a duopolis-
tic ￿rm under Cournot competition. The regulator solves an optimal stopping
problem in order to ￿nd the critical threshold for policy adoptions taking into
account revenues from taxes and auctioned permits and government spending.
In particular, we specify two possible ￿scal policy decisions. In the former, the
government revenues generated by pollution taxes and auctioned permits are
redistributed to the ￿rms and the consumers, while in the latter the collected
revenues are used to ￿nance pollution abatement activities.
Our paper improves on the current literature in several dimensions. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the ￿rst paper where the public ￿nance re-
quirements of environmental protection is embedded in a real option framework
about the timing of emission reductions. Moreover, in our model the regulator￿ s
objective function di⁄ers from the usual Pindyck (2000, 2002) social damage,
because it takes into account both the ￿rms￿pro￿ts, the consumers￿surplus,
the social damage from pollution and the net governmental revenues from the
environmental policies, allowing us to discuss the implications of the above pol-
icy interventions (i.e., taxes, emission standards, auctioned permits and freely
allocated permits) from the point of view of social welfare. Our paper extends
and generalize previous works on uncertainty a⁄ecting the policies to control
pollution (i.e., Pindyck, 2000, 2002; Conrad, 2000; Saphores and Carr, 2000;
Nishide and Ohyama, 2009; Xepapadeas, 2001; Van Soest, 2005) by consider-
ing an industry where ￿rms compete ￿ la Cournot, while the above-mentioned
papers have been concerned with a purely decision theoretic framework. Since
our analysis compares four policy instruments, it is also more exhaustive than
2most of them.
Our main results are that depending on the slope of output demand (i) the
optimal adoption threshold under emission standards may be larger or lower
than the adoption threshold under freely allocated permits, and (ii) the value
of social welfare, which includes the option to implement the environmental
policy to reduce emissions, under emission standards may be higher or lower
than the value of social welfare under freely allocated permits. Taxes and
auctioned permits are always equivalent in terms of their adoption lag and
social welfare and also equivalent to emission standards when the regulator
redistributes the revenues to society. Finally, through simulations we show that
taxes and auctioned permits are less preferred policy instruments in the case of
a regulator using the environmental policy revenues to ￿nance public abatement
activities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review.
Section 3 describes the setup of the model. Section 4 solves the optimal stop-
ping problem of the environmental regulator and ￿nds the rankings of the four
environmental policies when the environmental policy revenue is redistributed
to society (Propositions 1-4). Section 5 solves the optimal stopping problem of
the environmental regulator and ￿nds the rankings of the four environmental
policies when the environmental policy revenues are used to ￿nance abatement
activities (Proposition 5-7). Numerical results are presented in Section 6. In
particular, a detailed sensitivity analysis is shown as to deepen our understand-
ing of the e⁄ects of environmental taxes, emission standards, auctioned permits
and freely allocated permits on the optimal timing of emission reductions. Sec-
tion 7 concludes the paper. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Literature review
There have been many studies on e⁄ective policy solutions to environmental
degradation based on approaches that di⁄er from the present paper. Most of
them studied the impact of the policy choice on technological adoption. Coria
(2009) studies how the choice between emission taxes, auctioned permits and
freely allocated permits a⁄ects the pattern of adoption of an environmental-
friendly technology when ￿rms engage in Cournot competition and the regula-
tor commits to the ex post optimal environmental policy before ￿rms begin to
adopt the technology. In this framework she analyzes the impact of policy choice
over the number of periods that elapsed until the new technology is introduced
into the industry. Similarly, Montero (2002 a,b) evaluate the R&D incentives
to invest in abatement technologies when the regulator behaves myopically and
investment incentives come from a "direct" e⁄ect and a "strategic" e⁄ect un-
der di⁄erent market conditions. Montero (2002 a,b) ￿nd a ranking supporting
the use of taxes over emission standards and permits. Neither Montero (2002
a,b) nor Coria (2009) pay attention to the uncertainty regarding the timing and
value of the new technology. Our industry analysis starts from Coria (2009) and
Montero (2001 a,b), in that we assume a duopolistic market where ￿rms com-
3pete in output and examine four environmental policies, but then we introduce
uncertainty over the social costs of environmental damage and study the timing
of policy planning and adoption.
Van Soest (2005) analyzes the impact of environmental taxes and quotas on
the timing of adoption of energy-saving technologies under irreversibility and
stochastic arrival rate of the new technologies, and shows that: (i) increased
environmental stringency (measured in tax and its equivalent in terms of quota)
does not necessarily induce early adoption, and (ii) there is no unambiguous
ranking of policy instruments in terms of the length of the adoption lag. While
Van Soest (2005) studies the investment decisions of a single polluting ￿rm
under environmental regulations that impose sunk costs on the ￿rm, we consider
interacting ￿rms, a more exhaustive set of policy tools for abating emissions and
the role of public ￿nance on the decision between alternative policy instruments.
Our paper employs real option methodology. There are important reasons
to use real options when dealing with the choice of policy options for emis-
sion reductions. Some papers have employed a cost￿ bene￿t analysis, where
the social planner maximizes expected bene￿ts from some policy to calculate
the optimal level of current abatement of greenhouse gases, and hence the cur-
rent social cost of carbon. However, as pointed out by Pindyck (2000, 2002),
standard cost￿ bene￿t analysis fails to simultaneously capture the irreversibil-
ities and uncertainties about climate change and environmental policy inter-
vention. Irreversibilities can originate from the environmental damage caused
by atmospheric GHG concentrations and also from the sunk cost of adopting
policies to reduce emissions., e.g., to scrap obsolete technologies and adoption
of new ones, improve automobile gas mileage, etc. Real options are also the
appropriate methodology to incorporate the role of timing in policy adoption,
and timing has been indicated as a most crucial issue in the current political
agenda (see also the UN Framework Convention in Climate Change, 2011). Re-
cently, a number of studies in the real options literature have examined the
implications of irreversibility and uncertainty for the optimal timing problem of
environmental policy adoption in di⁄erent contexts (see, for example, Conrad
(1997, 2000), Saphores and Carr (2000); Xepapadeas (2001), Insley (2003), Van
Soest (2005), Wirl (2006); Ohyama and Tsujimura (2006); Nishide and Ohyama
(2009); Balikcioglu, Fackler and Pindyck (2011); Travaglini and Saltari (2011),
Agliardi and Sereno (2011)). However, none of them deals with interacting ￿rms,
nor addresses the issue of the public ￿nancing requirements of environmental
protection.
Our paper builds on Pindyck (2000), although he does not look at the rank-
ing of policy instruments for the control of pollution. He investigates how irre-
versibility in￿ uences the timing of policy planning and adoption in a framework
with either ecological or economic uncertainty. While Pindyck (2000) considers
the optimal timing for a single (unspeci￿ed) environmental policy adoption, we
consider the timing of four policies and analyze the impact of public ￿nance on
the critical thresholds of adoptions.
Agliardi and Sereno (2011) study the e⁄ects of two environmental policy
options for the reduction of pollution emissions. Their model endogenously
4takes into account the level of emissions before and after the adoption of the
new environmental policy. The level of emissions is determined by solving the
￿rm￿ s pro￿t maximization problem under taxes and ￿xed quotas, as in Van
Soest (2005). They ￿nd that the optimal adoption threshold under taxes is
always larger than the adoption threshold under ￿xed quota, even in a setting
characterized by ecological uncertainty and ambiguity over future costs and
bene￿ts over adopting environmental policies. To introduce tradeable emission
permits, we follow Coria (2009), and consider an industry composed of two
￿rms that engage in Cournot competition in the output market. Moreover, in
our model the regulator computes total bene￿ts as the sum of aggregated pro￿ts,
consumer surplus, social damage from pollution and revenues from each policy
instruments. In contrast, Agliardi and Sereno (2011) consider the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t
and social damage only, while Coria (2009) does not take into account public
revenue and government expenditures.
3 The model
We consider a market consisting of two pro￿t-maximizing ￿rms that produce a
homogeneous product. The linear inverse demand function is
p(Q) = a ￿ bQ; a;b > 0;
where p is the output market price, Q = q1 + q2 is the aggregate output and qi
denotes the level of production of ￿rm i.
Output production generates pollution and this damages the quality of the
environment. Let ei denote the discharges of the ith ￿rm. To manage this
emission, each ￿rm installs an abatement technology. Following Coria (2009)
and Montero (2002 a,b), we assume that the total abatement cost for each ￿rm
can be described as cir2
i, where ci is an index of cost and ri is the quantity of
emissions that ￿rm i reduces, that is:
ri = (qi ￿ ei):
There are no further production costs. Firms are assumed to compete ￿ la
Cournot in the output market.
3.1 The pollution process
Let Mt be a state variable that summarizes the stock of pollution, i.e., the
average concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere or the acidity level of a lake,
and let Et be the aggregate level of emissions, Et = e1;t + e2;t, that controls
Mt. The evolution of Mt over time is assumed to follow the same di⁄erential
equation in Pindyck (2000):
dMt = (Et ￿ ￿Mt)dt; M0 = M (1)
5where ￿ 2 [0;1) is the rate of natural decay of the stock pollutant over time, i.e.,
a fraction ￿ of the pollutant in the atmosphere di⁄uses into the ocean, forests
and soil.
We consider environmental policies which involve a one-time reduction in
Et. Speci￿cally, we denote by ￿ the unknown adoption time of the new envi-












dt for t ￿ ￿
(2)
The superscripts N and A indicate the state of no-adoption and adoption of
the new environmental policy, respectively. That means that until a policy
is adopted Et stays at the constant initial level EN, while policy adoption
implies a one-time reduction to a new permanent level EA; with 0 ￿ EA <
EN. Hence, EA quanti￿es the reduction of pollution growth induced by the
abatement activities of the whole industry. Under this assumption, the speed of
pollution accumulation is reduced by EN ￿ EA, a⁄ecting positively the quality
of the environment. In the next section we endogenously determine EN and EA
by solving the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t maximization problem under each policy instrument.
3.2 The ￿rm￿ s pro￿t maximization problem
At any time, the ￿rm i has to decide about the optimal levels of emission ei and
output qi to maximize the instantaneous operating pro￿t ￿i. In the absence
of any environmental regulation, the operating pro￿t of ￿rm i at time t equals
revenue minus the total abatement cost:
￿i = p(Q)qi ￿ ci (qi ￿ ei)
2 ; for i = 1;2 (3)
The optimal levels of emission and output for each ￿rm is given by the ￿rst
order conditions (FOCs) for ei and qi:
2ci(qi ￿ ei) = 0 (4)
p(Q) + p0 (Q)qi ￿ 2ci(qi ￿ ei) = 0
Eq. (4) says that, in the absence of any environmental regulation, production
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We assume that the regulatory goal is to limit the quantity of industry emis-
sions at some level EA by means of one of the following four environmental policy
instruments: emissions taxes, standards, freely allocated tradeable permits and
auctioned permits. To make instruments directly comparable we assume that,
in the initial situation, the level of emissions is the same under all four regimes.
Like Van Soest (2005), we assume that the environmental regulator has de-
termined the Pigouvian tax (￿) that equates the marginal bene￿ts and costs of
pollution. The emission target EA is then assumed to be equal to the amount of
emissions that the ￿rms will produce, given this tax rate. Hence, the objective
of the environmental regulator is to cap the aggregate level of emissions at EA
either by establishing standards for ￿rms or by issuing tradeable permits to be
distributed gratis or auctioned o⁄. Under emission standards, ￿rms￿emissions
are limited to ￿ e1 and ￿ e2 respectively, such that ￿ e1 + ￿ e2 = EA: Under permits
system, a total number of EA permits are either distributed freely, or auctioned
o⁄.
3.3 Taxes
In this section we compute the ￿rm￿ s operating pro￿t under taxes and determine
the level of emissions EA which serves as a benchmark for reduction of emissions.
Under tax regulation and Cournot competition, each ￿rm looks for the output
and the mix of abatement plus tax payment that maximizes pro￿ts. If the
environmental regulator has decided to charge a per unit fee equal to ￿, then








p(Q)qi ￿ ci (qi ￿ ei)
2 ￿ ￿ei
o
; for i = 1;2 (6)
The optimal level of emissions and output for each ￿rm is given by the FOCs
for ei and qi:
2ci(qi ￿ ei) = ￿; (7)
p(Q) + p0 (Q)qi ￿ 2ci(qi ￿ ei) = 0:
Eq. (7) indicates that at the optimum, each ￿rm faces a marginal abatement
cost equal to the emission tax ￿. Combining the the FOCs for ei and qi; we
have:
p(Q) + p0 (Q)qi = ￿ (8)
The term on the left-hand side in Eq. (8) is the marginal bene￿t of production,
while the term on the right-hand side is the marginal abatement cost. At the
7optimum, each ￿rm faces a bene￿t per unit of output equal to the tax ￿. The






where it is assumed that a > ￿ in order for equilibrium quantities to be positive.
Moreover, each individual ￿rm￿ s optimal level of emission under taxes, is:
eA
i =





3￿ is required, for equilibrium emissions to be positive. Notice
that eA
i < eN
i for any level of ￿:
Substituting (qA
i ; eA










The aggregate level of emissions Et which serves as a benchmark for reduc-





Under emission standards regulation and Cournot competition, the ￿rms will












subject to ei ￿ ￿ ei where ￿ ei is the emission standard established for ￿rm i.
Setting ei = ￿ ei we assume that the emission standard is equal to the amount of
emission that the ￿rm produces under taxes (eA
i ). The optimal level of output
for each kind of ￿rm is given by the FOC for qi:
p(Q) + p0 (Q)qi ￿ 2ci(qi ￿ eA
i ) = 0: (12)
The third term of (12) indicates that the environmental regulation raises mar-
ginal production costs by an amount equal to the marginal abatement cost at
ei = eA
i , which depend on the tax ￿: Substituting (9) into (12) and solving
the resulting term for qi, we obtain the ￿rm i￿ s best response function under
emission standards:
qi =
3ab + 2aci ￿ 3b2qj ￿ (3b + 2ci)￿
6b(b + ci)
:






which equals the level of output that the ￿rm will produce under tax regulation.
Finally, substituting (13) and (9) into (11) we obtain the following expression




















for any level of ￿.
3.5 Permits
Under tradeable permits regulation, each ￿rm looks for the output and the mix
of abatement plus emission permits that maximize pro￿ts. Following Montero
(2002 a,b) and Coria (2009), freely allocated permits and auctioned permits can
be analyzed within a unique framework. Denote by "i (> 0) the quantity of
permits received by ￿rm i and by ￿ the market-clearing price of permits after a
total of EA permits have been distributed gratis by the regulator. If instead the
EA permits are auctioned o⁄"i = 0, and both ￿rms become buyers of permits1.








p(Q)qi ￿ ci (qi ￿ ei)
2 ￿ ￿ (ei ￿ "i)
o
: (14)
The optimal level of emissions and production for each ￿rm is given by the
FOCs for ei and qi:
2ci(qi ￿ ei) = ￿; (15)
p(Q) + p0 (Q)qi ￿ 2ci(qi ￿ ei) = 0:
Eq. (15) indicates that at the optimum, each ￿rm faces a marginal abatement
cost equal to the permit price ￿. Combining the FOCs for ei and qi, we have:
p(Q) + p0 (Q)qi = ￿: (16)
The term on the left-hand side of Eq. (16) is the marginal bene￿t of production,
while the term on the right-hand side is the marginal abatement cost. At the
optimum, each ￿rm faces a bene￿t per unit of output equal to the permit price
￿:
1As remarked by Montero (2002 p. 32) the auction clearing price of permits is the same
as the market-clearing price of permits because there are no income e⁄ects.





The market clearing condition requires total demand to be equal to total supply:
e1 + e2 = EA; (18)
where EA is equal to the total amount of emissions that the ￿rms will produce







Substituting (19) into (17), we obtain:
e￿A
i =
2aci ￿ 3b￿ ￿ 2ci￿
6bci
: (20)
Substituting (20) and (10) into (18) and solving for ￿; we get:
￿
￿ = ￿:









2aci ￿ 3b￿ ￿ 2ci￿
6bci
: (22)
which are equal to the levels of output and emission under taxes. Substituting






4a2ci ￿ 8aci￿ + ￿(4ci￿ + 9b(￿ + 4ci"i))
36bci
: (23)
Notice that if permits are auctioned o⁄ (i.e., "i = 0), the operating pro￿t (23)
is equal to the operating pro￿ts under taxes, while if permits are distributed
freely (i.e., "i > 0) the operating pro￿t (23) is greater than the operating pro￿ts
under taxes (since ￿rms can gain from permits trading). Finally, note that the
operating pro￿t under auctioned permits is smaller than the operating pro￿t
under emission standards for any level of ￿ (since the operating pro￿t under
auctioned pro￿ts is equal to the operating pro￿t under taxes) while the operating
pro￿t under freely allocated permits is larger than the operating pro￿t under
emission standard for any b >
2ci(a￿￿)
3(2ci"i+￿):
104 The regulator￿ s problem
In this section we analyze the behavior of the regulator and the optimal stop-
ping problem under each instrument. Here we consider the case where the
government revenues generated by pollution taxes and auctioned permits are
redistributed to the ￿rms and the consumers. In Section 5 we will examine an
alternative ￿scal policy decision and assume that the collected revenues are used
to ￿nance pollution abatement activities.
4.1 The optimal stopping problem under each policy in-
strument
Using v (v = T;S;PFr and PAu) to denote the policy regime (i.e., taxes, emis-
sion standards, freely allocated tradeable permits and auctioned permits, re-
spectively), in each period the regulator is supposed to decide whether to adopt
the new environmental policy v or to postpone it to the next period.
Like Pindyck (2000), we assume that the ￿ ow of social costs (i.e. damages)
associated with the stock variable Mt is measured by the linear function:
D(￿t;Mt) = ￿tMt;
where ￿t is a variable that stochastically shifts over time to re￿ ect the damage
due to the pollutant and is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion:
d￿t = ￿￿tdt + ￿￿tdzt; ￿0 = ￿ (24)
for constants ￿ < r;￿ > 0, zt is a standard Brownian motion and r denotes the
risk-free rate of interest. The process ￿t is assumed to capture economic uncer-
tainty over future costs and bene￿ts of policy adoptions. For example, changes
in ￿t might re￿ ect the innovation of technologies that would reduce the damage
from a pollutant, or a change in the society environmental sensitivity that would
increase the social cost of Mt. The linearity of D(￿t;Mt) is convenient because
it makes the optimal policy independent of the stock Mt:
Let B (￿t;Mt) denote the net bene￿t from emissions, i.e. the sum of con-
sumer surplus (CS) plus the total pro￿ts earned by the ￿rms (￿) plus the
government revenue generated by each policy instrument (RV ) minus the en-
vironmental damage due to ￿rms￿production, D. If the regulator adopts the
policy v, the net bene￿t, is:
BA

























v is the aggregated pro￿t under each policy in-
strument. Given the demand curve , the consumer surplus CSA






11where QA = qA
1 + qA
2 is the aggregate quantity in the presence of intervention.





￿EA if v = T;PAu
0 if v = S;PFr
Both an emission tax and a system of auctioned permits generate government
revenues (which equal the tax rate times the determined emission target under
taxes), while emission standards and freely allocated permits do not generate
any government revenue. The revenue from taxes and auctioned permits can
be spent or redistributed to society. Here, we assume that the total tax (auc-
tion) revenue is completely redistributed to consumers and ￿rms in a lump-sum
fashion.
On the other hand, if the regulator never adopts the policy v; the net bene￿t
is:
BN (￿t;Mt) = CSN
t + ￿N
t ￿ DN(￿t;Mt),
where ￿N = ￿N
1 + ￿N





is the consumer surplus and QN = qN
1 +qN
2 is the aggregate quantity in
the absence of intervention. Here RV N = 0; because there is no public revenue




be the cost of permanently reducing the emission ￿ ows,











with h1; h2 ￿ 0: For simplicity, it is assumed that all instruments require the
same gross investment cost K
￿
EN ￿ EA￿
: This cost is assumed to be com-
pletely sunk.
The objective of the regulator is to choose the optimal timing of adopting
policy v that would reduce emissions to EA such that the expected net present
value function (using the discount rate r) of the di⁄erence between the net


























subject to Eq. (1) for the evolution of Mt and Eq. (24) for the evolution of
￿t. Here, T is the class of admissible implementation times conditional to the
￿ltration generated by the stochastic process ￿t: As usual, it is assumed that
r + ￿ > ￿ for the integrability of the net bene￿t function B (￿t;Mt):
Applying the Dixit and Pindyck (1994) methodology, we can derive the opti-
mal timing for the four environmental policies and the values to reduce emissions
12under the four environmental policies (see the Appendix). In particular, we can
compute the critical threshold ^ ￿v, v = T;S;PFr and PAu such that it is optimal























where ￿1 = r￿￿, ￿2 = r+￿￿￿ and ￿1 is the positive solution to the standard
characteristic equation. From a comparison among the critical thresholds ^ ￿v
and among the welfare functions Wv, we can get the following main results:
Proposition 1 The optimal adoption thresholds under taxes, auctioned permits
and emission standards are equivalent.
Proposition 2 The value of the welfare functions W under taxes, auctioned
permits and emission standards are equivalent.
For the following, let
b￿ =
4c1c2(a ￿ ￿)
3(c1(2c2("1 + "2) + ￿) + c2￿)
be the critical value of of the slope of market demand b that makes the regulator
indi⁄erent between adopting emission standards and freely allocated permits.
From a comparison between the thresholds ^ ￿S and ^ ￿P Fr and between the welfare
functions WS and WP Fr; we can get the following main results:
Proposition 3 The optimal adoption threshold under freely allocated permits
is larger than the adoption threshold under emission standards (or auctioned
permits or taxes) for 0 < b < b￿: The optimal adoption threshold under emission
standards (or auctioned permits or taxes) is larger than the adoption threshold
under freely allocated permits for b > b￿:
Proposition 4 The value of the welfare function W under freely allocated per-
mits is smaller than the value of the welfare function W under emission stan-
dards (or auctioned permits or taxes) for 0 < b < b￿: The value of the welfare
function W under freely allocated permits is larger than the value of the welfare
function W under emission standards (or auctioned permits or taxes) for b > b￿:
Proof. of Propositions 1, 2, 3 and 4: in the Appendix.
Corollary 5 The values of the options to reduce emissions under taxes, auc-
tioned permits and emission standards are equivalent. The value of the option
to reduce emissions under freely allocated permits is smaller than the value of
the option to reduce emissions under emission standards (or auctioned permits
or taxes) for 0 < b < b￿: The value of the option to reduce emissions under
freely allocated permits is larger than the value of the option to reduce emissions
under emission standards (or auctioned permits or taxes) for b > b￿:
13Propositions 1 and 2 are a straightforward consequence of the following facts:
(i) the (aggregated) pro￿t under auctioned permits is equal to the pro￿t under
taxes, and (ii) the (aggregated) pro￿t under emission standards is equal to the
pro￿t under taxes plus the revenue generated by the policy instrument, as shown
in the Appendix. One clearly observes this by comparing the critical thresholds
and the value of the options to reduce emission under taxes, auctioned permits
and emission standards.
Similarly, Propositions 3 and 4 are a straightforward consequence of the
fact that the (aggregated) pro￿t under emission standards is larger than the
operating pro￿t under freely allocated permits for 0 < b < b￿, while for b > b￿
the operating pro￿ts under freely allocated permit is larger than the operating
pro￿ts under emission standards (see the Appendix). The comparison between
emission standards (or auctioned permits or taxes) and freely allocated permits
depends ultimately on the market price elasticity. If the output demand is
more elastic (b smaller), then freely allocated permits o⁄er smaller incentives
than emission standards (or auctioned permits or taxes); alternatively, if it is
more inelastic (b larger), then the reverse is true. Thus, Propositions 1, 2, 3
and 4 provide us with a ranking between taxes, emission standards auctioned
permits and freely allocated permits in this setting, in a non equivocal way.
It is found that emission standards, emission taxes and auctioned permits are
more conducive to early adoption than freely allocated tradeable permits for
0 < b < b￿. Regulators may care about early adoption: in this case, emission
standards, taxes and auctioned permits outperform freely allocated permits,
i.e. they should be the preferred policy instrument. Contrarily, for b > b￿ freely
allocated permits are more conducive to early adoption than emission standards,
taxes and auctioned permits.
5 The optimal stopping problem with public spend-
ing
In this section we analyze the optimal stopping problem when the government
revenue generated by pollution taxes and auctioned permits are used to ￿nance
pollution abatement activities, e.g. abatement of water pollution, air pollution,
and, more generally, policies that protect the natural resources. Such policies are
costly and a major conviction is that public ￿nance should play a role in meeting
such requirements (see also European Commission Reports, 2009, 2010).
5.1 Budget constraint
Pollution taxes generate ￿EA revenues. Suppose that the government decides
to use these revenues to ￿nance pollution abatement activities. Assuming a
balanced budget, we have:
GS = ￿EA
14where GS denotes government spending. Under emission standard regula-
tion, ￿rms￿emissions are limited to the quantity of emissions that the ￿rms will
produce under taxes. Hence, in this situation there are neither public revenues
nor pollution abatement activities, i.e. GS = 0:
Finally, under tradeable permits system, a total number of EA permits are
either distributed freely or auctioned o⁄. Hence, the government spending is
equal to GS = ￿EA if permits are auctioned o⁄ and is equal to GS = 0 if
permits are distributed freely.
5.2 The pollution process and the regulator￿ s problem
with public abatement expenditures












dt; for t ￿ ￿
Under this assumption, the speed of pollution accumulation is reduced by a
factor GS which measures the environmental bene￿ts associated to the govern-



















A if v = T;PAu
EA if v = S;PFr:
with ￿
A ￿ EA ￿ GS = (1 ￿ ￿)EA. In such a framework there is more abate-
ment with taxes and auctioned permits than with emission standards or freely




be the (sunk) cost of permanently reducing the emission











with h1; h2 ￿ 0; and lA = ￿
A if v = T,PAu and lA = EA if v = S,PFr. Here the
cost of permanently reducing emission ￿ ows is larger under taxes and auctioned
permits than under emission standards and freely allocated tradeable permits.
It is also in keeping with some empirical evidence, where emission standards
and freely allocated permits are easier to be implemented and require smaller
organizational and administrative costs.
15The objective of the regulator is to choose the optimal timing of adopting
policy v that would reduce emissions to lA such that the expected net present
value function of the di⁄erence between the net bene￿t B (￿t;Mt) and the cost

























where BN (￿t;Mt) = CSN
t +￿N
t ￿DN(￿t;Mt) is the net bene￿t in the absence
of intervention and BA






v ￿DA(￿t;Mt) is the net bene￿t
in the presence of regulator￿ s intervention. Notice that environmental revenues
are not included in BA
v (￿t;Mt) since they are completely used to ￿nance public
abatement.
Following the same calculation as before, we can derive the optimal thresh-
olds for each policy instrument. In particular, we can compute the critical
threshold ~ ￿v, v = T;S;PFr and PAu such that it is optimal to adopt policy v


















for lA = ￿
A if v = T and PAu and lA = EA if v = S and PFr: From a comparison
between the thresholds ~ ￿T and ~ ￿P Au and between the welfare functions WT and
WP Au; we can get the following main results:
Proposition 6 Assuming that the collected revenues are used to ￿nance pollu-
tion abatement activities: (i) the optimal adoption threshold under taxes is the
same as the optimal adoption threshold under auctioned permits; (ii) the value
of the welfare function W under taxes is the same as the value of the welfare
function W under auctioned permits.
Moreover, from a comparison between the thresholds ~ ￿S and ~ ￿P Fr and be-
tween the welfare functions WT and WP Au; we can get the following main results:
Proposition 7 Assuming that the collected revenues are used to ￿nance pollu-
tion abatement activities: (i) the optimal adoption threshold under freely al-
located permits is larger than the adoption threshold emission standards for
0 < b < b￿; (ii) the optimal adoption threshold under emission standards is
larger than the adoption threshold under freely allocated permits for b > b￿:
Proposition 8 Assuming that the collected revenues are used to ￿nance pollu-
tion abatement activities: (i) the value of the welfare function W under freely
allocated permits is smaller than the value of the welfare function W under emis-
sion standards for 0 < b < b￿; (ii) the value of the welfare function W under
16emission standards is smaller than the value of the welfare function W under
freely allocated permits for for b > b￿:
Proof. of Propositions 6, 7 and 8: in the Appendix.
Unfortunately, we cannot compare the critical threshold under taxes and
auctioned permits with the critical thresholds under emission standards and
freely allocated permits, in our theoretical model. The reason is that there is
more abatement with taxes and auctioned permits than with emission standards
or freely allocated permits and hence the levels of emissions are di⁄erent under
the di⁄erent policy instruments. However, numerical simulations allow us to
compare the critical thresholds under taxes, emission standards and permits.
This will help us to shed light on the possible rankings of the policy instru-
ments under di⁄erent speci￿cations of the parameter values. We ￿nd that the
critical threshold under taxes and auctioned permits is always larger than the
critical threshold under emissions standards and auctioned permits. The reason
is that taxes and auctioned permits require higher costs of implementation and
therefore the stopping value associated with emission level ￿
A is lower than the
stopping value associated with the emission EA. When we compare the stop-
ping values with the continuation values it results that at the optimal adoption
time the critical thresholds under emission standards and freely allocated per-
mits are lower than the critical thresholds under taxes and auctioned permits.
Hence, emission standards and freely allocated permits are preferred to taxes
and auctioned permits if the regulator aims at speeding up the adoption of
pollution reducing policies. Moreover, comparing the critical thresholds under
emission standards and freely allocated permits we ￿nd that emission standards
are preferred to freely allocated permits when the output demand is more elas-
tic, while freely allocated permits are preferred if the output demand is more
inelastic. This result is in contrast with Coria (2009) where a di⁄erent ranking
is found. In particular, Coria (2009) shows that if the regulator wants to speed
up technological di⁄usion (i.e. ￿rms adopting pollution reducing technology)
auctioned permits are preferred to freely allocated permits and taxes when the
output demand is more elastic. Her model, however, considers a di⁄erent case
where a policy is adjusted in response to the availability of a new technology.
6 Simulation results
In this section we provide some numerical applications and sensitivity analy-
sis of the optimal thresholds under the alternative environmental policies for
the reduction of emissions. The simulations are implemented with Mathemat-
ica Programming. We assume that in the base case: ￿ = 0:01 (drift-rate of
economic uncertainty), r = 0:04 (risk-free interest rate), ￿ = 0:2 (volatility
of economic uncertainty), ￿ = 0:02 (natural rate of dispersion of pollution),
k1 = 100 (proportional cost); k2 = 100 (adjustment cost); a = 5 (average mar-
ket size); b = 1 (slope of the market demand); c1 = 4 (index of cost for ￿rm 1);
17c2 = 3 (index of cost for ￿rm 2); "1 = 3 (quantity of emissions permits received
by ￿rm 1); "2 = 2 (quantity of emissions permits received by ￿rm 2); ￿ = 0:2
(emission tax). The case b = 1 corresponds to an inelastic demand case.
Figure 1 shows the relation between the critical threshold ~ ￿v, v = T;S;PFr
and PAu and the volatility ￿. The dashed curve refers to the critical thresh-
old under taxes, the solid curve to emission standards and the dotted curve to
freely allocated tradeable permits. We recall that the critical threshold under
taxes coincides with the critical threshold under auctioned permits. We con-
sider values of the volatility ￿ ranging from 0 to 1: As in Pindyck (2000), the
critical thresholds are upward sloping with respect to ￿: The reason is that an
increase of economic uncertainty over future payo⁄s from reduced emissions in-
creases the value of waiting and raises the critical threshold ~ ￿v. The simulation
provides us with a ranking between taxes, emission standards, freely allocated
tradeable permits and auctioned permits (in terms of their adoption lag) when
￿ increases. We observe that the critical threshold under taxes and auctioned
permits is larger than the critical thresholds under emissions standards and
auctioned permits; moreover, it is found that the critical threshold under freely
allocated permits is lower than the critical thresholds under emissions stan-
dards, taxes and auctioned permits. That means that freely allocated permits
are more conducive to early adoption than emission taxes, emission standards
and auctioned permits in this base case.
Figure 2 shows the relation between the critical threshold ~ ￿v, v = T;S;PFr
and PAu and and the emission tax rate ￿. The dashed curve illustrates the
sensitivity of the critical threshold under taxes, the solid curve under emission
standards and the dotted curve under freely allocated tradeable permits. We
consider values of the emission tax rate ￿ ranging from 0 to 1: The critical
thresholds are upward sloping with respect to ￿: The reason is that a higher
￿ reduces ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts and thus necessitates a higher ￿ for the investment
in reduced emissions to take place. The intuition is as follows. The optimal
implementation time is de￿ned as that level of ￿ at which the continuation and
the termination values are equal. Evaluating both values at ~ ￿v and increasing
the level of stringency of environmental policy, decreases both the continuation
and the termination values. Indeed, a larger ￿ would reduce the level of emission
￿ ow and reduce the social cost of environmental damage. Moreover, higher levels
of environmental stringency render the ￿rm￿ s economic activity less pro￿table,
and hence reduce the value of the option to implement the environmental policy
(which would reduce social damage) in the future; overall, the e⁄ect on ￿rm￿ s
pro￿ts seems to dominate. That means that when faced with a more stringent
environmental policy, the continuation value associated with the emissions level
EN is larger than its termination value with emissions level lA, and hence the
regulator will decide to wait longer for adopting the new environmental policy
v:
The result that the more stringent the policy, the more ￿rms would de-
lay the adoption of lower emission policies, was also highlighted in Van Soest
(2005), however, using a di⁄erent model with a di⁄erent objective function.
Also Agliardi and Sereno (2011) obtain the same sensitivity results with re-
18spect to the stringency of environmental policy, although permits and public
expenditures are not taken into account.
The numerical simulation provides us with a ranking between taxes, emis-
sion standards and permits. It is found that the critical threshold under taxes
and auctioned permits is larger than the critical thresholds under emissions
standards and freely allocated permits. Moreover, it is found that the critical
threshold under freely allocated permits is lower than the critical thresholds un-
der taxes, emissions standards and auctioned permits. As in the previous case,
freely allocated permits are more conducive to early adoption than emission
taxes, emission standards and auctioned permits.
Figure 3 shows the relation between the critical threshold ~ ￿v, v = T;S;PFr
and PAu and the slope of the market demand b: The dashed curve refers to
the critical threshold under taxes and auctioned permits, the solid curve to
emission standards and the dotted curve to freely allocated tradeable permits.
We consider values of b ranging from 0:1 (elastic output demand case) to 2
(inelastic output demand case). The critical thresholds are downward sloping
with respect to b: The reason is that a higher b would reduce the level of emission
￿ ow and reduce the social cost of environmental damage and thus necessitates
a lower ￿ for the investment in reduced emissions to take place. The intuition
is as follows. In the Cournot game the level of output depends inversely on the
price elasticity. As the output demand is more inelastic the level of emissions
is lower and the ￿rm￿ s economic activity is less pro￿table. Also the option to
implement the environmental policy (which would reduce social damage) in the
future is less valuable. That means that when faced with a more inelastic output
demand, the continuation value associated with the emissions level EN is lower
than its termination value with emissions level lA, and hence the regulator will
decide to speed up the adoption of the new environmental policy v:
The numerical simulation provides us with a ranking between taxes, emission
standards, freely allocated tradeable permits and auctioned permits, in terms
of their adoption lag, when b increases. It is found that (i) the critical threshold
under taxes and auctioned permits is larger than the critical thresholds under
emissions standards and freely allocated permits. (ii) the critical threshold
under freely allocated permits is larger than the critical threshold under emission
standards for values of b ranging between 0 and about 0:63, while the critical
threshold under emission standards is larger than the critical threshold under
freely allocated permits for values of b greater than about 0:63. Thus, the
regulator is indi⁄erent between adopting emission standards and freely allocated
permits when b ￿ = 0:63: The regulator will prefer emission standards to freely
allocated permits when the value of b ranges between 0 and (about) 0:63: And
￿nally the regulator will prefer freely allocated permits to emission standards
when the value of b is greater than (about) 0:63:
Finally, Figure 4 shows the relation between the critical threshold ~ ￿v, v =
T;S;PFr and PAu and the average market size a: The dashed curve refers to the
critical threshold under taxes and auctioned permits, the solid curve to emission
standards and, ￿nally, the dotted curve to freely allocated tradeable permits.
We consider values of a ranging from 1 to 15: It is found that freely allocated
19permits are more conducive to early adoptions than taxes, emission standards
and auctioned permits for values of a ranging between 0 and 7:7875, while for
values of a greater than 7:7875 emission standards are more conducive to early
adoption than taxes, emission standards and auctioned permits.
FIGURE 1: Relation between the critical threshold ~ ￿T and
~ ￿P Au and the volatility of economic uncertainty ￿ (dashed
curve). Relation between the critical thresholds ~ ￿S and the
volatility of economic uncertainty ￿ (solid curve). Relation be-
tween the critical thresholds ~ ￿P Fr and the volatility of economic
uncertainty ￿ (dotted curve).
20FIGURE 2: Relation between the critical threshold ~ ￿T and
~ ￿P Au and the environmental tax ￿ (dashed curve). Relation
between the critical thresholds ~ ￿S and the environmental tax ￿
(solid curve). Relation between the critical thresholds ~ ￿P Fr and
the environmental tax ￿ (dotted curve).
FIGURE 3: Relation between the critical threshold ~ ￿T and
~ ￿P Au and the slope of the market demand b (dashed curve).
Relation between the critical thresholds ~ ￿S and the slope of the
market demand b (solid curve). Relation between the critical
thresholds ~ ￿P Fr and the slope of the market demand b (dotted
curve).
21FIGURE 4: Relation between the critical threshold ~ ￿T and
~ ￿P Au and the average market size a (dashed curve). Relation
between the critical thresholds ~ ￿S and the average market size
a (solid curve). Relation between the critical thresholds ~ ￿P Fr
and the average market size a (dotted curve).
7 Conclusion
This paper is about the optimal timing of a new environmental policy in a frame-
work where production causes pollution, economic volatility is the main source
of uncertainty, competing ￿rms are regulated by taxes, emission standards, auc-
tioned permits or freely allocated permits and the government is concerned with
the ￿nance requirements of the environmental protection. In particular, two
possible ￿scal policy decisions are considered: either, the government revenues
generated by pollution taxes and auctioned permits are redistributed to the
￿rms and the consumers, or the collected revenues are used to ￿nance pollution
abatement activities.
Our main results concern the rankings of the alternative policy options in
terms of their adoption lag and social welfare. We show that when the output
demand is elastic emission standards are preferred to freely allocated permits.
Alternatively, if demand is inelastic, freely allocated permits provide more in-
centives than taxes, emission standards and auctioned permits. Taxes and auc-
tioned permits are always equivalent in terms of their adoption lag and social
22welfare and also equivalent to emission standards when the regulator redistrib-
utes revenues.
Our paper contributes to the recent debate in the literature by discussing the
impact of these alternative policy instruments on the optimal timing of emission
reductions. Environmental protection and the timing of policy intervention have
become a priority and a challenge for many governments indeed. In our model
there is an unambiguous ranking of these policy instruments in terms of the
adoption lags: if regulators wish to speed up the implementation of technologies
reducing pollution emissions, then they may prefer standards to taxes or permits
if demand is rather elastic. This result is robust to the two ￿scal policies adopted
and to various relevant parameters. Therefore, our sensitivity analysis provides a
clue to regulators who are faced with environmental issues where economic costs
and bene￿ts cannot be forecasted and a lot of scenarios can be considered. An
interesting extension is to examine the e⁄ects of asymmetric information among
actors in the economy, for example, the e⁄ects of signaling on environmental
policies where each ￿rm privately knows whether its technology is clean or not,
while third parties (i.e., the regulator) have only a subjective perception about
it. We leave such issue for future research.
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Appendix A
Derivation of the critical threshold ^ ￿v; T;S;PAu and PFr
In this Appendix we derive the optimal timing for the environmental policy
v. Let WN
v = WN
v (￿;M) denote the value function for the "no-adopt" region
240 ￿ t < ￿v , in which Et = EN. The corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation is:
rWN


















It has the following general solution:
WN



















where ￿1;v and ￿2;v are unknowns to be determined, ￿1 = r ￿ ￿ and ￿2 =
r+￿￿￿: Here, ￿1 and ￿2 are the solution to the following characteristic equation:
1
2
￿2￿(￿ ￿ 1) + ￿￿ ￿ r = 0

































The term between the squared parentheses in (26) is a particular solution, which
captures the expected net bene￿t from emissions in the case the environmental











































where EN is given by (5). Therefore, the parenthesis in (26) represents the fun-
damental term and the exponential terms account for the perpetual American
option value.
Next, let WA




v = ￿EA if v = T;PAu and
￿
RV A￿
v = 0 if v = S, PFr. Since
we consider environmental policies which involve a one-time reduction in Et,
25there is no option term after pollutant emissions have been reduced to EA:
So in this case the solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is given
by its particular solution which captures the regulator￿ s expectation about net
bene￿t from abated emissions under the policy instrument v and is calculated
as follows:
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We know that the solutions for WN
v (￿;M) and WA
v (￿;M) must satisfy the
following set of boundary conditions (see Pindyck 2000):
WN
v (0;M) = 0; (27)
WA
v (0;M) = 0; (28)
WN





















Here, ^ ￿v is a free boundary, which must be found as part of the solution, and
which separates the adopt from the no-adopt regions. It is also the solution to
the stopping problem (25):
￿v = inf
n
t > 0; ￿ ￿ ^ ￿v
o
The policy v should be adopted the ￿rst time the process ￿t crosses the threshold
^ ￿v from below. Boundary conditions (27) and (28) re￿ ect the fact that if ￿t is
ever zero, it will remain at zero thereafter. Conditions (29) and (30) are the
value matching and the smooth-pasting conditions, respectively. Conditions




























26Accordingly, we disregard the negative root in order to prevent the value from
becoming in￿nitely large when ￿t tends to 0; thus, we set ￿2;v = 0 (see Dixit
and Pindyck 1994). So (13) becomes:
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The ￿rst term on the right-hand side of Eq. (31) is the value of the option to
adopt policy v and reduce emissions to EA, while the remaining terms represent
the regulator￿ s expectation about net bene￿t from emissions BN (￿t;Mt):



























































































Proof of Proposition 1
We want to show that the optimal adoption thresholds under taxes, auc-


















































By simplifying the above equation yields:
￿
￿A￿
T + ￿EA = (￿A)S:
Substituting the expressions for the target and pro￿ts we obtain:










2ac1 ￿ 3b￿ ￿ 2c1￿
6bc1
+












Equation (35) gives zero. Thus, the critical thresholds under taxes and un-
der emission standards are equivalent. In the same way, we can show that
^ ￿S = ^ ￿P Au: Since the pro￿ts under auctioned permits and under emission taxes
are equivalent, repeating the same calculations as before yields the result in
Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2


































It is easy to show that ￿1;T equals ￿1;S. Let us consider the exponential
term in (31) which accounts for the perpetual American option value. Then,
substituting the expressions for ￿1;T and ￿1;S into the option term and com-
paring the two values, we ￿nd that the value of the option to reduce emissions
under taxes is equal to the value of the option to reduce emission under emission
28standards. It should be noted that the objective function W (as of t = 0) should
not be interpreted as the option value alone but as the social welfare function
that includes the value arising from the welfare prior to the environmental pol-
icy adoption (capturing the pro￿ts earned by the non adopting ￿rms plus the
consumer surplus minus the social damage with no adoption) plus the option




). By comparing the two value functions it results that
the value of the welfare function W under taxes is equal to the value of the
welfare function under emission standards. Repeating the same reasoning it is
easy to show that the value of the welfare function W under emission standards
is equivalent to the value of the welfare function W under auctioned permits.
The result in Proposition 2 follows.
Proof of Proposition 3
We want to show that the optimal adoption threshold under freely allocated
permits is larger than the adoption thresholds under emission standards for
0 < b < b￿: Thus:
￿
￿1￿1￿2























































4a2c1 ￿ 8ac1￿ + ￿(4c1￿ + 9b(￿ + 4c1"2))
36bc1
+
4a2c2 ￿ 8ac2￿ + ￿(4c2￿ + 9b(￿ + 4c2"2))
36bc2
<















3(c1(2c2("1+"2)+￿)+c2￿) > 0. Since b > 0 by assumption, the result in
Proposition 3 follows.







S for 0 < b < b￿ may also explain why the
value of the welfare function W under freely allocated permits is smaller than
the value of the welfare function W under emission standards for 0 < b < b￿:

































It is immediate to show that ￿1;P Fr < ￿1;S if 0 < b < b￿. Let us consider
the exponential term in (31) which accounts for the perpetual American option
value. Then, substituting the expressions for ￿1;P Fr and ￿1;S into the option
term and comparing the two values, we ￿nd that the value of the option to
reduce emission under freely allocated permits is smaller than the value of the
option to reduce emission under emission standards for 0 < b < b￿. As before,
the objective function W (as of t = 0) should not be interpreted as the option
value alone but as the social welfare function that includes the value arising
from the welfare prior to the environmental policy adoption plus the option to
implement an environmental policy. By comparing the two value functions the
result in Proposition 4 follows.
Appendix B
Derivation of the critical threshold ~ ￿k; T;S;PAu and PFr
In this Appendix we derive the optimal timing for the environmental policy v
when the regulator uses the accrued revenues to ￿nance public abatement activ-
ities. In this framework, the value function for the no-adopt region, WN
v (￿;M)
must satisfy the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
rWN


















which has the following solution:
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where ￿1 is the positive solution to the standard characteristic equation.
30The value function for the adopt region, WA
v (￿;M); can be calculated di-
rectly as:
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where lA = ￿
A if v = T and PAu and lA = EA if v = S and PFr: The solu-
tions for WN
v (￿;M) and WA
v (￿;M) must satisfy the following set of boundary
conditions:
WN
v (0;M) = 0;
WA
v (0;M) = 0;
WN





















where ~ ￿v is the critical value of ￿ at or above which the optimal environmental
policies should be adopted. The critical threshold ~ ￿v and the value of ~ ￿1;v can
be easily computed as in the previous section.
Proof of Propositions 6, 7 and 8
Propositions 6, 7 and 8 can be easily proved by following the same argument
of the previous section.
31